

Entanglements of European Cities and States

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THE END OF THE fifteenth century brought a major change in European diplomacy and warfare. France (finally restored to vigor after the extenuation of the plague and the Hundred Years' War), Aragon (still an independent kingdom despite the momentous marriage of its monarch, Ferdinand, with Isabella of Castile), and Venice (then a fearsome maritime power with domains scattered from the Adriatic and the Mediterranean to the Black Sea) began bidding for positions on the Italian mainland. At the same time, dealing with the expansive Ottoman Empire preoccupied an increasing number of European potentates. General wars, furthermore, resumed with increasingly expensive artillery, fortifications, and mercenary armies. The rulers of Italian city-states, who for a century had been free to cut each other's throats without vigorous, visible external intervention, found themselves contending continuously with Europe's great powers.

In 1510 and 1511, the pope and Ferdinand of Aragon turned against France, their former ally in the League of Cambrai formed two years earlier to counter Venetian expansion. They threatened France's Italian allies as well. The most steadfast among those allies, the Florentine republic, found its days of independence numbered. As the French retreated in 1512, the conquering powers forced Florence to enthrone the long-exiled Medici, who promptly undertook to eliminate their enemies from the city. One of the republic's major functionaries, Niccolò Machiavelli, suffered torture and expulsion.

During years of exile from his beloved Florence, Machiavelli wrote the books for which we remember him, among them *The Prince*. Chapter 5 of that great guide to Renaissance statecraft bore the title "The Way to Govern Cities or Dominions That, Previous to Being Occupied, Lived Under Their

Own Laws." "When those states which have been acquired are accustomed to live at liberty under their own laws," commented Machiavelli,

there are three ways of holding them. The first is to despoil them; the second is to go and live there in person; the third is to allow them to live under their own laws, taking tribute of them, and creating within the country a government composed of a few who will keep it friendly to you. Because this government, being created by the prince, knows that it cannot exist without his friendship and protection, and will do all it can to keep them. What is more, a city used to liberty can be more easily held by means of its citizens than in any other way, if you wish to preserve it.¹

Machiavelli left little doubt about his preference for the third course. Nevertheless, his advice to a prince takes for granted that an effective ruler will conquer new territory, that he will seek to incorporate conquered territories into his domains, that several means of incorporation (direct rule, indirect rule, or annihilation) are feasible, and that the prior existence of a coherent government in a conquered city poses a political problem as well as a political opportunity.

This last Machiavellian insight touches the question before us: In Europe after A.D. 1000, how did the density and organization of cities in a region affect changes in the character of states? Did the histories of states follow different courses in times and places of varying urban density? How did rulers of states negotiate with the city-dwellers in their midst? How did those who ran cities negotiate with the rulers of states? In short, how did urbanization and the transformation of states interact?

The chapters in this book examine that interaction in detail. Our essays survey the variety of transformations European states underwent after A.D. 1000, asking how they intersected with the changing configuration of cities in Europe. More precisely, we want to know how variable processes of urbanization constrained changes in the character of European states. To help answer that question, we examine both (1) how rulers interacted with urban populations in different regions or periods and (2) what correspondences between urban structure and type of state appear at the large scale. Most chapters in the book focus on the first problem. My introduction and the conclusion by Wim Blockmans focus on the second.

Given the salience of Paris, Moscow, Rome, Madrid, and London in the histories of European states, one might have thought these connections would dominate comparative analyses of European political history. Nothing of the sort has happened. The synthetic and comparative literature on states offers surprisingly little guidance in answering our questions. Of course, histories of France tell us much about interactions between Paris and French kings, histories of the Venetian republic follow urban factions in detail, and histories of Muscovy pay plenty of attention to Moscow, its capital.

But general treatments of state structure and change rarely mention state-city relationships. Nor, for that matter, do they give much attention to any variation in the paths along which states travel. In the exemplary recent synthesis by John Hall and John Ikenberry, for example, the question does not come up at all; the authors simply ignore why states take different forms in different times and places.² Gianfranco Poggi, in his own ambitious summing up, explicitly declares, "I take little notice of the differences the development [of the modern state] presents in different regions of Western Europe."³ If variation does not matter, then urbanization does not matter much either.

As a whole, the scholarly literature on states follows Poggi's rule: Varying forms and differing trajectories of change in the organization of states come up for discussion chiefly as major evolutionary stages (e.g., from traditional to modern states), as expressions of different major economic systems (e.g., capitalist versus socialist states), as competing constitutional models (e.g., parliamentary versus presidential systems), or as some combination of the three. Although those bases of variation all deserve analysis, they leave standard questions of comparative politics untouched. Why, for example, should the oil-producing Middle Eastern states of Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and Iran have such disparate political regimes? Why should Latin American states that all acquired independence as the Spanish Empire disintegrated early in the nineteenth century have followed such contrasting trajectories since then? Scholars have occasionally sought to answer questions of this sort by invoking evolutionary stages, contrasting economic systems, or competing constitutional models, but their efforts have remained unconvincing.

The synthetic and comparative literature on states breaks into four rough categories:

1. *geopolitical* analyses, which attach great importance to the international system as the shaper of states within it;
2. *mode of production* analyses, which derive the structures of states from the logic of the productive systems with which they are associated;
3. *world-system* analyses, which trace the histories of states to their changing positions in the world economy; and
4. *statist* analyses, which treat political change as proceeding in partial independence of economic change, chiefly as a consequence of events within particular states.

So far, geopolitical analyses, as exemplified by Kenneth Waltz's neorealist models, have provided possible explanations of various states' diplomatic and military policies, but they have yielded no useful accounts of variation in state organization. Mode of production and world-system analyses, as ex-

emplified by the works of Perry Anderson and Immanuel Wallerstein, offer accounts of change and variation in state structure; they treat states as the creatures and instruments of dominant classes, whose characters vary markedly from one mode of production or one niche in the world system to another. Such accounts, however, almost always reduce cities to expressions of their dominant classes and surrounding economies. They allow no place for the independent effects of cities on states.

Statist analyses have come a little closer, at a great sacrifice of generality. Thus Lisa Anderson clarifies the substantially different histories of Libya and Tunisia through sustained comparison, and Richard Lachmann contrasts the states and class configurations of England and France during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Indeed, hundreds of authors have examined particular states or pairs of states such as England, France, Prussia, Spain, the Dutch Republic, or Russia in order to bring out the particularities of their experiences. The puzzle remains: How can their conclusions be generalized?

In an earlier effort, I thought an improved analysis of "state formation" in Europe would help produce the essential generalizations. Although that inquiry yielded some valuable results in other regards, I confess now to regretting my part in promoting that particular framing of the problem. At the time, it seemed like a good idea. Like the colleagues who joined me in publishing *The Formation of National States in Western Europe* in 1975, I had acquired severe doubts about the teleology of the then-current catchwords *political development* and *political modernization*. In setting up our joint inquiry, we had accepted the definition of the subject matter as "state- and nation-building." The longer the work went on, the more doubtful we became of the engineering metaphor—building, *Bau, edificazione*—with its implications of foresight and directionality. Hence when it came time to put our conclusions into book form to report our findings, I chose what seemed a more neutral, historicist term: *formation*. Anthropologists and archaeologists had occasionally used the term to describe the appearance of states where none had existed before. As far as I know, our book introduced it into the literature on political change in the West.

In context, the term had some justification. We aimed the book at explaining "the emergence of the alternative forms of Western states."⁴ We concentrated, furthermore, on how and why the "national" state came to be the dominant form in Europe after 1700. By "national state" we meant one that:

1. controlled a well-defined, continuous territory;
2. was relatively centralized;
3. was differentiated from other organizations;
4. reinforced its claims through moves toward monopolization of coercive means.

I made a mistake in calling such states *national* because of the term's suggestion that they embodied *nations*, or homogeneous peoples. From the eighteenth century onward, Europeans created an ideology and a practice of the nation-state, arguing that homogeneous peoples deserved their own states, creating origin myths for existing states, and promoting the dominance of one set of cultural idioms within a given state. In fact, almost all states remained quite composite, either through their toleration of multiple regional cultures, their reception of large immigrations, or both. Even Norway and Sweden, for example, still have substantial regions of Sami culture, and most European countries remain even more polyglot, religiously divided, and culturally various than Scandinavia. The ideology matters since it bolsters the claims of such regions as Croatia, Slovakia, and Georgia to states of their own. Yet it would be much clearer to call the territorially continuous, centralized, differentiated, coercion-monopolizing state *consolidated*.

By state formation, in any case, we meant the whole set of processes whereby this sort of state first appeared among the many other varieties of European states, then became the dominant variety. If the matter had stayed there, our terminological innovation would probably have done no harm. Between 1500 and 1800, the period on which our book concentrated, the "national" state, in this limited sense of the term, really did take form and then begin to prevail in western Europe. If we had managed to restrict the term *state formation* to that shift, the problem would have remained fairly clear.

The trouble lay elsewhere. First, we actually inquired occasionally into how city-states, empires, federations of commercial cities, and other types of states as well as the "national" state formed without insisting that those processes did *not* constitute state formation. Second, we called attention to a great many activities, such as control of food supplies, that all sorts of states undertook, without reserving the term *state formation* for those that promoted the circumscription of territory, centralization, differentiation, and the monopolization of coercive means. Third, once out of its original setting, the term *state formation* suggests either that the "national" state's predecessors were not full-fledged states or that the same processes produce all sorts of states in all eras and parts of the world; hence books and articles started appearing on such subjects as state formation in the contemporary Third World, in which authors searched for deliberate analogies with the processes we had identified as crucial in western Europe. Finally, my use of our findings to criticize previous theories of political development emphasized the extractive, coercive, war-making side of state activity so strongly as to substitute implicitly a new unilinear model, this one centered on coercion, for the more consensual unilinear models that had gone before. These were all seductive errors, to us and to others after us. Only the success of our efforts

in persuading other scholars to follow our lead revealed the trap we had dug for ourselves.

In a more recent effort, I corrected one problem but not the other. *Coercion, Capital, and European States, A.D. 990–1990* (first published, appropriately, in 1990) deliberately examined variation in the trajectories followed by European states over the millennium in question. It continued to employ, however, the vocabulary of state formation rather than *transformation*. Precisely because the book examined a period in which the varieties of viable states multiplied in Europe before eventual convergence on the consolidated state of our own time, the inconsistency in the vocabulary became even clearer than in *The Formation of National States in Western Europe*. The present book, then, adds another corrective to the dialectical chain. For Europe, it explores the possibility that the variable distribution of cities and systems of cities by region and era significantly and independently constrained the multiple paths of state transformation. It argues that states, as repositories of armed force, grow differently in different environments and that the character of the urban networks within such environments systematically affects the path of state transformation.

Why might we suppose that analytically separable effects of urbanization actually exist? We have several reasons for the supposition. First, in Europe, striking correspondences between the geographical distributions of cities and states endured for centuries, with—as we shall see abundantly—very different sorts of states evolving in densely urban regions and in regions with few cities. Second, where distinctive forms of urban organization existed early in the consolidation of major states, they typically survived the growth of state power and played significant roles in subsequent national politics. Third, urban merchants and financiers typically wielded considerable influence in the organization and growth of state facilities, especially armed forces, both because they entered actively into public finance and because they controlled the markets that supplied new institutions with their wherewithal. Where few merchants and financiers existed, on the other hand, a politics of warlords and landlords more often prevailed. These facts give us *prima facie* reasons for looking hard at city-state relations and their changes in Europe. Let us start at the last millennium, A.D. 1000, and work forward.

CITIES VERSUS STATES

Over most of the past 10,000 years, the world's cultural, political, and economic epicenter has lain somewhere around the Indian Ocean; Europe has generally constituted the westerly periphery of overlapping systems oriented to such centers as Constantinople, Baghdad, Edo, or Hangchow. As of 1000 A.D., most of Europe remained quite peripheral despite the temporarily

stronger connections to world trade and communication afforded them by Roman, Byzantine, and Islamic Empires. Muslim navigators, merchants, and rulers then mediated European relations to much of the non-European world. Córdoba (capital of the Umayyad caliphate) and Constantinople (seat of the Byzantine Empire) were Europe's largest cities by far. Within Europe, the Muslim-controlled western Mediterranean and the eastern Mediterranean, increasingly oriented to an axis from old Constantinople to newcomer Venice, contained the most intensive regions of trade. At the millennium, in short, relations to the great Asian-based system of trade and conquest strongly affected the relative prosperity of different European regions.

Maps of the time that divided Europe into neatly distinct countries present a seriously misleading impression of cultural and political interpenetration. In actuality, languages, religions, trading systems, and political jurisdictions overlapped and intertwined to a degree that defies mapping; beyond the scale of a city-state, any territorial sovereign drew tribute from multiple peoples and dealt with members of trade diasporas whose cultural bases lay far away. The closer they lived to the southeast corner of Europe, the more likely it was that these ordinary Europeans were multilingual, engaging in separate tongues for trade, political administration, and domestic affairs.

Within Europe, three basic forms of government proliferated into a vast variety: (1) petty despotisms operated by military specialists, (2) city-states oriented to trade and the exploitation of their agricultural hinterlands, and (3) empires concatenating central military organizations, thin regional administrations, trading networks, and organizations of tribute in which local and regional rulers—often maintaining cultural identities distinct from that of the empire's center—enjoyed great autonomy in return for collaboration in the collection of tribute and support in the empire's military campaigns. In all three forms and their variants, especially the petty despotisms and empires, landlords played crucial parts in supplying nonagricultural populations and the government of local areas; landlords often mobilized their own armed force, from household retainers to private armies. None of the three approximated the sharply demarcated, centrally administered states that have predominated in Europe over the last century or so.

In the year 1000, three different relations between cities and states prevailed in Europe. Over much of the Mediterranean, empires based in opulent capitals ruled cities that were carrying on both commercial and administrative activities. From Catalonia to Italy and in the denser urban clusters across the Alps, sovereignty fragmented into city-states, minor episcopal domains, and similar localized arrangements only nominally connected with great overlords. In the rest of Europe, landlords governing substantial domains and private armies, some of whom had royal titles attached to wispy

state structures, coexisted uneasily with the rarer merchant-run cities in their zones of influence.

Looking forward from the year 1000, a European sibyl might therefore have reasonably predicted a number of changes that never occurred:

- increasing subordination of European trade to that of the eastern Mediterranean, the Middle East, the Indian Ocean, and East Asia;
- continued expansion of Muslim power in continental Europe;
- the rise of city-states, city-empires, and religious organizations as the dominant European political structures;
- cyclical destruction of those political structures' power, especially in eastern Europe, by nomadic invaders from the Eurasian steppe; and
- battles among armed tribute-takers and their personal armies as the predominant form of war.

Why none of these became the prevailing pattern is the major unanswered question in European history. In this book, we propose to approach the question by examining the variable articulations of cities and states in different regions of Europe between A.D. 1000 and 1800. We concentrate on the period before 1800, for two reasons: (1) because the small existing literature on city-state interaction has concentrated unduly on the period since 1800, presuming that cities remained relatively insignificant—except as capitals—before the massive urbanization of the last two centuries, and (2) because the variable relations between cities and states prior to 1800 strongly marked the nature of government in different regions of Europe after that point.

Cities shape the destinies of states chiefly by serving as containers and distribution points for capital. By means of capital, urban ruling classes extend their influence through the urban hinterland and across far-flung trading networks. But cities vary in how much capital their oligarchies control; seventeenth-century Amsterdam made once-glorious Bruges look puny. The fact that cities are loci of capital accumulation, furthermore, gives the urban political authorities access to capital, credit, and control over hinterlands that, if seized or co-opted, can serve the ends of monarchs as well.

States, in contrast, operate chiefly as containers and deployers of coercive means, especially armed force. But they, too, vary in how much they control; in the 1630s, for example, Spain's 300,000 troops under arms dwarfed Holland's 50,000 and Sweden's 45,000. Similar inequalities in armed forces have prevailed throughout the history of European states.

Over Europe as a whole, alterations in the state control of capital and of coercion between A.D. 1000 and the present have followed two parallel arcs. Consider capital: At first, European monarchs generally extracted what capital they needed as tribute or rent from lands and populations that lay under their immediate control—often within stringent contractual limits on the

amounts they could demand. In a middle period (especially between 1300 and 1700 or so), they relied heavily on formally independent capitalists for loans, for management of revenue-producing enterprises, and sometimes for collection of taxes. By the eighteenth century, however, many sovereigns were incorporating the fiscal apparatus directly into the state structure and drastically curtailing the involvement of independent contractors.

On the side of coercion, a similar evolution took place. During the early period, monarchs drew armed forces from retainers, vassals, and militias who owed them personal service—but again within significant contractual limits. Later (again, especially between 1500 and 1700), they turned increasingly to mercenary forces supplied to them by contractors who retained considerable freedom of action. Finally, sovereigns absorbed armies and navies directly into the state's administrative structure, eventually turning away from foreign mercenaries and hiring or conscripting the bulk of their troops from their own citizenries.

By the nineteenth century, most European states had internalized both armed forces and fiscal mechanisms; they thus reduced the governmental roles of tax farmers, military contractors, and other independent middlemen. Their rulers then continued to bargain with capitalists and other classes for revenues, manpower, and the necessities of war. Bargaining, in its turn, created numerous new claims on the state: pensions, payments to the poor, public education, city planning, and much more. In the process, states changed from magnified war machines into multipurpose organizations. Their efforts to control coercion and capital continued but were now accompanied by a wide variety of regulatory, compensatory, distributive, and protective activities.

Before the nineteenth century, states differed markedly in the relative timing and intensity of the two main processes of change. The Dutch state avoided heavy investment in mercenaries by favoring sea warfare over combat on land, and it created state-managed finances precociously, yet long remained beholden to the capitalists of Amsterdam and other commercial cities. In Castile, on the other hand, land forces—often hired outside Spain—prevailed; there, the monarchy captured the credit of merchants by turning them into rentiers and by relying on colonial revenues for their reimbursement. Portugal, Poland, the Balkans, Italian city-states, and the states of the Holy Roman Empire followed other variations on the two arcs and thereby created distinctly different state structures.

The varying intersections between the processes by which capital and coercion concentrated and came under state control help explain the geographic pattern of European state formation, the differential incorporation of urban oligarchies and institutions into consolidated state structure, and the shift in state power from the Mediterranean to the Atlantic. To understand those processes, we must look at the history of war and its financing.

WARS, STATES, AND CAPITAL

The coercive means controlled by European states have risen almost incessantly over the last millennium, no matter what standard we employ to measure this: the absolute mass of force at the disposition of the average state, the relative bulk of coercive means available to the state and its individual citizens, or the extent to which the state monopolized concentrated force within its own territory. The great increase in stateheld force resulted from an interplay between alterations in the state system and technical changes in war-making. But it depended on a large financial transformation.

Although it was once possible for a monarch to wage war with his own routine revenues and the poorly paid services—voluntary or coerced—of his clients and servitors, it became increasingly necessary to borrow in the short run for the immediate expenses of the military and to tax in the long run for maintenance of the armed forces and repayment of the debt. In both regards, especially the financing of debt, the energetic participation of men (they were usually men, not women) who had access to large amounts of cash and credit became crucial. Thus the concentration of coercion depended in part on the concentration of capital.

Pursuit of war generates many demands: for troops, arms, equipment, transport, lodging, and food. The relative salience and ease of acquisition of these requisites depend on both the type of warfare and the commercialization-capitalization of the ambient economy. Noble cavalry and their retainers, for example, typically received land, booty, and privilege but little money for their services. The shift to a mercenary infantry with siege artillery (which occurred widely in Europe during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries) greatly increased the financial requirements of war, but it took place without mobilizing large proportions of the national population into armies and navies. Mass warfare of the eighteenth- or nineteenth-century type only occurred with huge outlays of cash and large organizational efforts. Sea warfare, on the whole, cost plenty but required less manpower; a nation that was already mercantile and seafaring could make the conversion to a war footing with relative ease. To the extent that weapons, ammunition, vehicles, and other machines became prominent means of war, the availability of money took on greater importance than the supply of men. States varied greatly in their ability to provide for these different kinds of war-making.

In Europe before 1800 or so, most important changes in state structure stemmed from rulers' efforts to acquire the requisites of war, from resistance to those efforts, and from bargains that ended—or at least mitigated—that resistance. Courts, treasuries, representative assemblies, central administrations, fiscal structures, and much more formed and reformed in response to the creation of military force, the pursuit of war, and the payment of its costs.

How much state structure issued from war-making depended, to be sure, on the interaction between (1) the type of war, (2) the character of the economy, and (3) fiscal strategy. A ruler who wanted to build military power in a relatively uncommercialized agrarian economy, such as Russia, had little choice but to enlist the support of landlords, to conscript peasants, and to tax property—a process that ordinarily created massive bureaucracies. A commercialized maritime state, such as Venice, on the other hand, could rely on customs and excise (which are relatively inexpensive to collect) and emphasize sea power without forming a vast central administration; the strategy could only work, however, with the close collaboration of merchants and financiers. Where merchants and financiers *ran* the state, as in the republics of Venice and Dubrovnik at the peaks of their commercial power, the major problem was to coordinate their domestic commercial interests.

All makers of war on a large scale therefore conquered, co-opted, or otherwise allied themselves with those who had effective competing claims on the potential means of war: other war-makers within their own territories, landlords (who overlapped, of course, with other war-makers), clergy, and capitalists. At first, European monarchs used the influence of these groups to control workers and peasants, who often paid the final bill for war. Eventually, as their demands for taxes and manpower rose, all states turned to at least a modicum of direct bargaining with workers, peasants, and other classes—in the form of either negotiated settlements to rebellions and revolutions or elections, assemblies, referenda, and other consultative devices.

Rulers who could avoid bargaining with the mass of the population by means of external revenues (e.g., from colonies), repression, or (more likely) both, did so. But most found themselves bargaining. With whom they made the strongest bargains depended on the various classes' relative strength and the kind of war the state was preparing. Where landlords predominated and rulers fought with massed infantry, privileged classes of noble officers, often charged with recruiting their own troops, emerged; where capitalists were strong and naval warfare salient—the two often coincided—the crown typically confirmed the privileges of the patricians and of their cities.

After 1300 or so, no ruler who seriously pursued war avoided reliance on capitalists of some sort. The activity of capitalists facilitated the concentration of coercive means in the long run by making them increasingly available through monetized markets and in the short run by making cash and credit available—at a price. But capitalists, when they had a choice, resisted the concentration of the means of coercion, except insofar as it increased the protection of their own uses of capital; in general, they preferred to use their capital in other ways, rather than spending it on war or loaning it to the crown, and rightly feared that a powerful ruler would both tax their proceeds and inhibit their transactions with other capitalists elsewhere.

Hence, rulers faced a dilemma. Every state that mounted a large war apparatus eventually surmounted this dilemma, but the paths past it, as the chapters in this volume show, ran in radically different directions. The variable interaction of capital and coercion significantly affected those paths. Over the long run, almost all European states moved toward greater concentrations of both coercion and capital. But in some, concentrations of coercion grew earlier and more emphatically than concentrations of capital; in others, the reverse was true. Poland provides an example of coercion-intensive history; the Netherlands has a capital-intensive history.

Early paths affected later developments. If a state began by means of brute conquest in rural regions (Castile is a case in point), its successors generally exploited and cramped the cities in its midst. If, in contrast, merchants and cities lay at a state's origins (Barcelona and Aragon come closer to this pattern), cities and citizens usually enjoyed a measure of autonomy or at least of representation. A middle path, combining considerable concentrations of both capital and coercion (London and the rest of England, with their antagonistic synthesis of merchants and landlords, illustrate this trajectory), promoted substantial, rich states. Coercion-intensive, capital-intensive, and capitalized-coercion paths of state transformation differed significantly from each other.

CITY SYSTEMS VERSUS STATE SYSTEMS

These differences divided Europe into contrasting regions. To see the geographic pattern more clearly, we should distinguish between city systems and systems of states. European cities formed a loose hierarchy of commercial and industrial precedence within which, at any point in time, a few clusters of cities (usually grouped around a single hegemonic center) clearly dominated the rest. (The European hierarchy, to be sure, formed only part of a vaster urban network that reached far into Asia at the period's beginning and extended to Africa and the Americas as time went on.) In Fernand Braudel's useful simplification, Venice, Antwerp, Genoa, Amsterdam, London, and New York successively dominated the European system of cities from the fourteenth century to the twentieth.

For dominance, the crucial matter was not so much size as centrality in the European network of trade, production, and capital accumulation. Nevertheless, the concentrations of capital and urban population corresponded closely enough that the dominant *cluster* of cities was always also one of the largest. For example, Jan de Vries's computation of "urban potential" singles out regions centering approximately on Antwerp, Milan, and Naples as the peaks of the European urban system in 1500, but in 1800, the zone around London (including areas across the English Channel) clearly predominated.⁵

One thousand years ago, a tenth of the European population (which totaled perhaps 39 million, excluding Russia) lived in settlements of 5,000 people or more. Today the proportion is around two-thirds of the Continent's population of 475 million (again, excluding Russia). In A.D. 1000, only a few hundred such places existed anywhere in Europe; by 1990, they numbered in the thousands. At the millennium, a threshold of 5,000 inhabitants clearly singled out urban centers: foci of communications for considerable regions, major connectors with distant populations and activities, loci of specialized production, accumulation, distribution, and administration. By the recent past, it brought together not only unquestioned cities but also hundreds of agricultural villages, suburbs, satellite industrial sites, military installations, and recreational communities.

The time between A.D. 1000 and 1800 brought nothing like linear growth in the urban areas of Europe. Even over the Continent as a whole, we must distinguish at least five phases: (1) considerable urban expansion, accompanied by a general population growth that was almost as significant, up to 1300 or so; (2) a dramatic slowdown, punctuated with food shortages and plague epidemics, up to 1500; (3) acceleration of both urban growth and general population increase (resulting in a slight rise in the urban share), accompanying Europe's energetic exploration, conquest, and mercantile expansion outside the Continent, up to the early seventeenth century; (4) another slowdown in the population increase and urban growth, coupled with a proliferation of cottage industries, during the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries; and (5) unprecedented population increase, outrun by spectacular urban growth associated with the formation of capital-concentrated urban manufacturing, from 1750 onward.

Urban growth was distributed very unevenly over Europe's surface. The Eurasian map of A.D. 1000 clearly showed Europe lying on the periphery of a huge commercial-imperial system extending from the Mediterranean to the Indian Ocean and China and on into the Pacific. Within Europe, cities clustered around the Mediterranean. The two greatest metropolises were Córdoba and Constantinople. They connected directly to the impressive non-European cities of Fez, Cairo, Aleppo, Hasa, Baghdad, Jerusalem, Rayy, and Isfahan. Caravan roads reached east to China; small cities like Sarajevo earned their livings as caravan stops and transshipment points for long-distance trade. Urban tendrils reached north from Mediterranean and Black Sea roots. The most substantial tendrils linked small trading cities of southwestern Germany, Flanders, and northern France to the thriving city-states of Italy. Raiding and conquering Vikings had also managed to establish a connection between such Russian cities as Novgorod and Kiev with the east-west mercantile system to their south.

Up to 1300, the system grew with little change in its overall contours; the greatest alteration was the prosperity of the German-Flemish axis, which

spilled over into adjacent areas like the Baltic and southern England. The subsequent depression simply froze that new balance. During the sixteenth-century surge, however, an emphatic recasting of the map to the north and west occurred: Along with imperial power, urban densities actually declined around the Mediterranean as Flanders became the center of a greatly expanded urban field. By 1750, the urban dominance of northwestern Europe left no doubt. The period since then has seen a vast expansion of urban regions and an intense further urbanization within them but no fundamental break with a pattern oriented to the densely packed cities of the Low Countries, western Germany, northern France, and southern England. The great long-term alteration of European urban distribution, then, preserved the axis from Italy to England but gave the northwestern end of that axis greater and greater weight.

The map of states divided Europe up very differently. To understand the map, we must apply the term *state* generously, including any organization that commanded substantial means of coercion and successfully claimed durable priority over all other users of coercion within at least one clearly bounded territory. In the year 1000, relatively large Muslim states dominated much of the western Mediterranean, including southern Spain and Africa's north coast. Other sizable states included the kingdom of France, the Saxon empire, the Danish kingdom, Russia, Poland, Hungary, Bohemia, and the Byzantine Empire. On the whole, the rulers of these political entities drew tribute from the territories nominally under their control, but outside their home regions, they gave them little administrative attention and saw their authority continually contested by rival potentates, including their own putative agents.

Within the ring formed by these weak, ephemeral states, sovereignty fragmented even further, as hundreds of principalities, bishoprics, city-states, and other authorities exercised overlapping control in the small hinterlands of their capitals. Except for the relative urbanity of Muslim lands, the correlation between size of states and density of cities was negative: Where cities swarmed, sovereignty crumbled.

During the following millennium, Europe's political map changed even more fundamentally than did its distribution of cities. By 1500, Muslims were retreating from Spain but building a substantial empire around the eastern Mediterranean and making inroads in the Balkans, states fielding large armies and extending some judicial and fiscal control over good-sized territories were beginning to appear around Europe's edges, and city-states were arming for land war as never before. Europe was starting to consolidate into territorially distinct states organized around permanent military establishments.

But this was only a beginning, to be sure. In 1500, armies consisted largely of mercenaries hired by the campaign, clients of great lords, and citizen mili-

tias. Standing armies had displaced urban militias in France and Burgundy but few other realms. Tribute and personal rents still contributed greatly to royal revenues. Within the larger states, communities, guilds, churches, and regional magnates retained wide areas of immunity and self-government. Administration chiefly concerned military, judicial, and fiscal affairs. Europe's central zone continued to teem with tiny jurisdictions. Since city-states, leagues of cities, dynastic empires, principalities having only nominal bonds to larger monarchies or empires, and ecclesiastical entities such as the Teutonic Order all coexisted (however contentiously) on the Continent, it was not clear that consolidated states as we know them would become Europe's dominant organizations.

On a small scale, some type of city-state seemed a viable form of rule; on a large scale, empires held together by tribute-yielding, semiautonomous authorities and backed by the intermittent use of centrally assembled military force continued a pattern that had flourished in Eurasia for thousands of years. Not until the nineteenth century, with Napoleon's conquests and the subsequent unifications of Germany and Italy, did almost all of Europe settle into mutually exclusive states having permanent, professional armed forces and exercising substantial control over the people in areas of 40,000 square miles or more.

These changes in the geographies of European cities and states had strong implications for the interactions of city-dwellers and state-makers. Between 1000 and 1500, roughly speaking, cities were rare, and states were numerous. Many more or less autonomous political entities had no city of any size, and the rulers of most cities of 10,000 or more exercised something resembling sovereignty within their own walls and their immediate hinterlands. Relative to territorial lords, urban oligarchies wielded considerable political power. The situation varied, however, from center to periphery: In the dense urban band, city-states and similar organizations predominated, but on Europe's more rural flanks, princes, sultans, and bishops carried greater weight and more often subordinated any cities that existed to their own jurisdiction.

After 1500, the formation of consolidated states coupled with the proliferation of cities to change the city-state relationship both numerically and politically. Suppose, for purposes of counting, we take any entity having a recognized sovereign, its own distinct armed force, and its own formally designated resident ambassadors as a state. Numerically, the proportion of cities of 10,000 or more grew from about one for every three such states in 1500, to two or three per state in 1800, to roughly 180 per state today. Politically, the odds that the oligarchy of any single city would dominate a state declined drastically. The proliferation of cities facilitated a state-making strategy of divide and conquer, the gradual monopolization of coercive means by consolidated states weakened the defensive positions of cities vis-à-vis national authorities, and the expansion of state administrative appara-

tus (which was itself largely a consequence of war and the preparation for war) gave those authorities increasing ability to monitor and control the urban population.

Again, how these processes worked varied from one part of Europe to another. The variation sets the problem explored in this volume: How did the character and density of urban organization affect the course of state formation in different parts of Europe? Wim Blockmans and I did not impose the line of reasoning just sketched on our fellow authors. We did, however, ask them a series of questions about city systems, capital, and state formation in different parts of Europe, with special emphasis on the period before 1800. The questions were:

1. What connection, if any, existed between the market positions of late medieval and early modern cities and the forms of their municipal institutions, especially the representative institutions?
2. What power structures did the ruling classes of major trading cities create on a supralocal scale: town leagues, ports-of-trade, city-states, monopolistic commercial companies, or federations? Were their protection costs for inhabitants of the core cities lower than those imposed by consolidated states?
3. What response did cities and their institutions make to the efforts of state-makers to impose control on them, draw capital from them, and tax them?
4. Did the strategies and successes of state-makers vary systematically according to the market positions of cities (e.g., Seville versus Madrid or Danzig versus Berlin)?
5. What effect, if any, did the character of cities in a region have on their relation to those national states that formed and the general structure of those states?
6. What effects, if any, did the imposition of control by consolidated states have on the market position of formerly autonomous trading cities?
7. At what points did the relationship between cities and states change most drastically and why?

We asked these questions of specialists in the history of Scandinavia, Poland, the Low Countries, German Europe, Italy, Spain, Portugal, and the Balkans. We deliberately avoided the classic cases of France and England because their histories are fairly well known, because we wanted to leave room for an exploration of the wide variation in the interactions between cities and states, and because we wanted to resist the ever-present temptation to treat France and England as the "successful" examples of state formation and all

others as failures to be explained by features of the French and English experience that they lacked.

Readers can use the individual essays in several different ways. First, they provide succinct, authoritative descriptions of states and their transformations in nine important regions of Europe over several centuries of social change; they provide unconventional documentation of the urban and political history in those regions. Second, they contain evidence bearing on general arguments about the histories of European states, including those that Wim Blockmans and I present in our essays; they therefore provide readers with independent grounds for judging such arguments. Third, they teem with suggestions, implicit or explicit, relevant to the analysis of city-state interaction elsewhere. Traian Stoianovich's treatment of the Ottoman command economy, for example, immediately raises questions and hypotheses concerning the economies of other great empires, including those of China, Persia, India, and Japan. To read Marjolein 't Hart's analysis of fiscal organization in the Dutch Republic is to ask urgently what part the organization of state finances and taxation has had in shaping the states of other continents and eras. In short, a reader who finds the scheme of city-state interaction I have laid out in this essay unconvincing will nevertheless discover material of immediate value in the chapters that follow.

CONTRASTING CASES

What relations between cities and states and between capital and coercion do the essays in this volume describe? Before trying to sort out general patterns, let me highlight some points of the individual chapters.

Giorgio Chittolini on Italy's City-States. If the Dutch fashioned a durable federation of self-interested city-states, Italians created no more than temporary coalitions among their city-states and city-empires. Even in the face of conquest by Spain and repeated military threats from other powers, Italian city-states guarded their sovereignty with greater enthusiasm than they put into joint military efforts. Yet, as Chittolini explains, the equation was not simply 1 city equals 1 state. Larger cities such as Florence and Milan conquered and dominated *contadi* (dependent territories) that included formerly independent cities and their hinterlands, and fifteenth-century Venice shifted, to some extent, from maritime trade, piracy, and overseas colonization to conquest of territory—including many other cities—on the Italian mainland.

The cities of north-central Italy differed from their Dutch counterparts in harboring oligarchies that devoted a significant part of their energy to agrar-

ian and military activity. Many of their states succumbed to Spanish conquest, and others declined in vigor as trade moved from the Mediterranean to the Atlantic. Still, not until the nineteenth century did a system of small territorial states each dominated by the oligarchy of a single city give way to a state resembling the large multicity organizations that had long prevailed north of the Alps.

Sergij Vilfan on Istria and Dalmatia. Although he covers an even greater chronological range and includes stubbornly independent Ragusa-Dubrovnik, Vilfan essentially treats the area of the northeastern Adriatic that Venice controlled during most of the fifteenth to eighteenth centuries. As if to illustrate the changing contours of states in southeastern Europe, the territories he examines now belong to Italy, Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina (the latter two in fierce contestation with Serbia), but at times, they have fallen variously under the control of Austria, Hungary, Serbia, and the Ottoman Empire as well as Venice. With their arrangement of port cities having their own subject territories stretching into the interior mountains, they constitute a fascinating variant of city-state Europe that shares some properties with northern Italy and others with Switzerland. In their own way, they experienced capital-intensive transformations of state structure.

Creatures of commercial expansion around the Adriatic, cities bustled as transit points in the export of agricultural products from their hinterlands. Their governments issued from an interaction between the external jurisdictions that claimed them (the contrast between territories of the Habsburg Empire and the Venetian republic being exemplary) and their common mercantile organization, which guaranteed that merchants and financiers would wield significant local power in whatever formal institutions prevailed. Vilfan points out, however, that from the sixteenth century onward, as monarchies and oligarchies consolidated their holds on the region's dominant states, regional nobilities likewise gained political strength in each subdivision; the new nobilities merged urban patriciates with rural landlords.

Traian Stoianovich on the Ottoman Balkans. Advancing and receding like a great glacier, the Ottoman Empire occupied much of European territory south and east of Venice and Istria for hundreds of years. At its western edge, the zone studied by Stoianovich overlaps the Dalmatia analyzed by Vilfan. Within that zone, Stoianovich singles out a distinctive feature of Ottoman rule: the imposition of a command economy on urban areas. As compared with the coastal Adriatic, the interior regions on which he concentrates followed coercion-intensive trajectories, with both landlords and armed countrymen playing major parts in national politics. In the Balkans, the Ottoman Empire generally ruled indirectly through Turkish landlords, military officers, removable officials, and tax farmers, all of whom enjoyed consider-

able autonomy within their own spheres but remained strictly responsible to the Sublime Porte. The region experienced frequent and violent rebellions, especially in periods when Ottoman power was contracting and the chances of profitable connections with western Europe were expanding.

Adopting the logic of central-place theory, Stoianovich shows that a relatively complete hierarchy of cities, centered on Constantinople-Istanbul, eventually extended into the Balkans. He likewise shows that a centralized (if incomplete) command economy pumped goods out of the countryside, up the hierarchy, and toward the capital. However intentionally, Ottoman authorities accomplished the same thing by imposing taxes and rents in rural areas that forced country people into urban markets and returned part of their income from those markets to the authorities. The state backed its regional representatives with armed force. Over the long run, however, the sheer development of the system made it advantageous for intermediaries to skim off larger portions of revenues nominally due to the central state, gain lifetime or hereditary control over their positions, and divert state power to their own advantage.

The presence of overlapping jurisdictions, the frequent pursuit of war, the position of the Balkans on the great overland route between western Europe and East Asia, and the entrepreneurial activities of Jews, Armenians, and Greeks, however, all attenuated any simple hierarchical action of the sultan's economy. Finally, after 1750, the peripheralization and sabotage of the command economy changed the relation between Istanbul and its hinterland, simultaneously transforming the Balkan economy and weakening the state's capacity to hold on to its possessions in the region. More so than any of our other essays, Stoianovich's analysis reveals the delicate interaction between state power and the organization of capital.

Peter Moraw on the Holy Roman Empire. German-speaking regions, in Moraw's account, had both vigorous cities and strong states. Nevertheless, the fundamental political structures of Germany bore the unmistakable stamp of princes and nobles and only ceded places to the bourgeoisie by drawing them into feudal social relations. Considerable variation, furthermore, appeared within German territory. The early division between the city-rich regions of the Rhine and Danube, on one side, and the more rural lands to the east, on the other, prefigured later maps of sovereignty; relatively autonomous free cities and imperial cities endured to the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries toward the west, and territorial cities holding substantial hinterlands under essentially feudal control prevailed further east. On the whole, cities grew more salient in German life from the thirteenth century on, with 1450-1650 being a crucial period for urban expansion and influence. At that time, urban magnates such as the Fuggers wielded great power in the empire. Still, insists Moraw, German cities never gained the up-

per hand; princes absorbed them into a system of power that retained its feudal cast.

Anders Andrén on Scandinavia. In the territory that eventually became Norway, Sweden, Denmark, and the Scandinavianized sections of Finland, warrior-monarchs founded many towns and established control over others early on. In many cases, urban settlements came into being as outposts for military and fiscal control of a fractious countryside. Although the expansion of the Baltic trade and the arrival of foreign (especially German) merchants enriched Scandinavian towns, royal agents and vassals maintained their priority in urban life. With commercial activity, however, cities became more interesting to kings as sources of taxes, especially excise and customs. In the process of expanding taxation, cities acquired charters, separate institutions, state-guaranteed monopolies, distinct identities, and a certain amount of power to bargain with the crown. On the whole, the weight of commerce, capital, urban oligarchies, and municipal rights grew lighter with movement north from Denmark. But in the period before 1550, nowhere in Scandinavia did municipal institutions or urban oligarchies wield significant power over the consolidated state.

Andrzej Wyrobisz on the Polish-Lithuanian State. If German states overshadowed their cities, the Polish state barely had any cities with which to contend. Its territory included vast agricultural domains, scattered villages, and few cities of importance. Only Gdansk participated actively in the great circuits of international trade. Nobles and gentry dominated the state and elected its king. They also controlled most towns—founding, organizing, taxing, and legislating for them at their own convenience. The more perceptive nobles and gentry recognized a contradiction between their desires to draw state revenues from cities and to make cities serve the short-run needs of the aristocracy, but the Polish political system greatly favored the second outcome. The result was a further contradiction: a state under virtually complete control of a military aristocracy that was unable to mobilize a major military effort at a national scale.

Pablo Fernández Albaladejo on Aragon, Castile, and Spain. Pablo Fernández emphasizes the fallacy of treating “Spain” as a unitary state, for, until recent centuries, the Iberian peninsula hosted a conglomerate of dynastically linked monarchies. In Aragon, the great port of Barcelona bore a relation to the crown vaguely similar to the one linking Lisbon to Portugal. In Castile, Madrid remained the headquarters of a fractious landowning nobility, which, like the crown, profited first from the capture of Muslim lands within the peninsula and then from the creation of an overseas empire. Nevertheless, the oligarchies of Madrid and other Castilian cities enjoyed some au-

tonomy, reinforced by their representation in the Cortes. In both Aragon and Castile, royal borrowing for military expenses eventually encouraged merchants to become rentiers rather than entrepreneurs, a change that made the crown all the more dependent on the empire’s uncertain revenues.

Antonio Manuel Hespanha on Lisbon and Portugal. Portugal’s history conforms more closely to classic models of state formation than do the histories of Italy, Poland, or the Dutch Republic. Yet even in Portugal, the correspondence was not close. An unchallenged metropolis, Lisbon, maintained tenuous relations with an agricultural hinterland and combined maintenance of the bulky national and imperial administrative apparatus with heavy involvement in world-spanning international trade. We should not exaggerate the distinction between administration and trade since such large governmental institutions as the *Casa da India* occupied themselves chiefly with commercial transactions; the monarchy, after all, drew a large share of all its income from profits on overseas trade.

At a pole far removed from Scandinavian or Polish monarchs, Portuguese kings had the great advantage of deriving much of their income and credit from the commerce of a single city, dominated by their agents. By the same token, however, the Portuguese crown remained vulnerable to a decline in Lisbon’s commercial vigor, and Lisbon’s commercial oligarchy retained power in royal affairs. Portugal’s situation—more so than that of Scandinavia, Poland, Germany, Holland, or Italy—resembled the situation of today’s oil-producing states: Ready revenue gave its rulers wide autonomy vis-à-vis the population they ruled, but it made them dependent on the continued flow of that revenue and on the people who produced it.

Marjolein ’t Hart on Amsterdam, Holland, and the Dutch Republic. What a contrast with Poland and Germany! Marjolein ’t Hart describes a contingent federation of city-states that formed in rebellion against Spanish centralization and fiscal pressure, created little durable national state apparatus, yet, on occasion, mounted enormous concerted military efforts. The Dutch drew on a deeply commercialized economy and cities occupying major positions in international trade. Self-renewing patricians who had made their money from trade and manufacturing ran those cities, named the deputies to the States General, took positions on foreign policy directly reflecting their particular commercial interests, and occasionally made war at their own initiative. Above all, Amsterdam (which the revolt turned into the preeminent Dutch city by cutting off the new state from the southern Netherlands and therefore from previously dominant Antwerp) weighed heavily in the republic’s deliberations and inspired numerous coalitions among other cities to check its power.

Characteristically, members of the States General acted by unanimous consent and lacked any substantial fiscal power of their own. They chose The Hague as their meeting place precisely because the town was neutral territory, lacking municipal powers and commercial strength. But the superficial resemblance to Poland, with its *liberum veto* (rule of unanimous consent), masked a great difference: Although the Dutch nobility had some power in the interior provinces, a well-connected commercial and industrial bourgeoisie ran the cities and therefore the state.

GENERAL IMPLICATIONS

The geography and timing of changes in Europe's systems of cities and states suggest that the positions of cities within market hierarchies (international markets, regional markets, exclusively local markets, and so on) correlated approximately with their size, their demographic impact on their hinterlands, the extent of their capital accumulation, and their ability to build up and control an extended sphere of influence. It seems that these, in turn, strongly affected the relative attractiveness of different cities as sources of capital for building armies and for state formation, the autonomy of their ruling classes with respect to would-be and actual state-makers, and the strength of their representative institutions.

As a consequence, major trading cities and city-states mounted more effective resistance to the penetration of consolidated states than did cities in mainly agrarian regions. Most often, consolidated states only gained genuine control over major trading cities when the cities had begun to lose their predominant positions in international markets. Even then, important trading cities managed to build into the state apparatus more of their local and regional power structures than did local and regional market centers, and their presence in great numbers generally slowed down the formation of consolidated states.

Our accounts indicate that the focus of bargaining over the wherewithal of war strongly affected the forms of representation that emerged. In Portugal, with its strong reliance on overseas trade for royal income, we see few representative institutions of any kind except for the strong presence of Lisbon's municipal government as interlocutor; in Aragon, we observe Barcelona in a similar relation to the crown; in Castile, we witness the power invested in the Cortes, an instrument of great landlords and of eighteen cities' oligarchies. On the whole, urban institutions themselves seem to have become part of state structure more readily where capitalists predominated.

States in which capitalists and bourgeois institutions played commanding roles had great advantages when it came to the rapid mobilization of capital for expensive wars. But they remained vulnerable to withdrawals of capital, demands for commercial protection, and blockage of the waterways on

which they relied so heavily. The Dutch Republic illustrates clearly the costs and benefits of capitalist dominance. The military advantage of such states nevertheless varied with the prevailing type of warfare: It was historically great for naval warfare, less so for artillery and cavalry, and an actual disadvantage in mass-army tactics.

Permanent military forces reduced (but by no means eliminated) surges in the demand for military means and thereby increased the advantage of states having long-term credit and large tax bases. States such as Prussia, France, and Britain—often considered models of effective state formation—combined the co-optation of landlords and merchants and built standing armies (and navies) in the time of mass-army tactics, from the Thirty Years' War to the Napoleonic Wars. The essays in this volume teach us that contrasts among the textbook examples occupied only a narrow band in the whole spectrum of European state formation.

The various combinations of coercion and capital across the European map show us multiple paths of state formation and an ultimate convergence on states with high concentrations of both capital and coercion. The relative availability of concentrated capital and concentrated means of coercion in different regions and periods significantly affected the organizational consequences of making war. Until recently, only those states that held their own in war with other states survived, and over the long run, the changing character of war gave the military advantage to states that could draw large, durable military forces from their own populations, which were increasingly consolidated states.

The coercion-capital reasoning also suggests some possible solutions to a series of historical problems concerning the histories of European states. What, for example, accounts for the roughly concentric pattern of European state formation, with large, autonomous states forming early on the periphery and regions of fragmented sovereignty enduring around the center? This pattern reflects the uneven spatial distribution of capital and therefore sets off the relatively large but capital-poor states that ringed the Continent from the swarm of smaller, capital-rich statelike entities that proliferated near its center. The contrast distinguishes exterior states (such as Sweden and Russia) that went through their formative years with relatively large concentrations of coercion and relatively small concentrations of capital both from interior states (such as Genoa and Holland) for which the opposite was true and from intermediate states (such as England and France) in which concentrations of capital and coercion grew side by side.

Again, why did European states vary so much with respect to the incorporation of urban oligarchies and institutions? States that had to contend from the start with urban oligarchies and institutions generally incorporated those oligarchies and institutions into the national structure of power. Representative institutions generally first appeared in Europe in two circum-

stances: (1) when local populations undertook difficult cooperative ventures, such as control of the sea in the Netherlands, and (2) when local, regional, or national governments bargained with groups of subjects who had enough power to inhibit the governments' operations but not enough power to take control of them. Where the governments in question were more or less autonomous states and the groups of subjects were urban oligarchies, municipal councils and similar institutions commonly became integral elements of the state structure. Where a single city predominated, a very effective form of state—the city-state or city-empire—emerged. The city-state and city-empire lost out, however, once mass armies recruited from the state's own population became crucial to successful warfare.

Why, despite obvious interests to the contrary, did rulers frequently accept the establishment of institutions representing the major classes within their jurisdictions? In fact, those institutions were the price and outcome of bargaining with different members of the subject population for the where-withal of state activity, especially the means of war. Kings of England did not *want* a parliament to form and assume ever-greater power; they conceded power to barons and then to clergy, gentry, and bourgeois in the course of persuading them to raise the money for warfare.

Why did political and commercial power slide from the city-states and city-empires of the Mediterranean to the substantial states and relatively subordinated cities of the Atlantic? They lost out not only because the Atlantic and Baltic trade eclipsed that of the Mediterranean but also because control of massive, permanent armed force became increasingly crucial to a state's success in politics and economics alike. When, in the late sixteenth century, Spain, England, and Holland all started to send large, armed vessels into the Mediterranean for trade and piracy (the two were not so distinct), city-states such as Ragusa, Genoa, and Venice found that their previous reliance on speed, connections, and craftiness was no longer enough to evade massive commercial losses. The owners of big ships that were suitable for long ocean voyages won out commercially and militarily as well.

Why did city-states, city-empires, federations, and religious organizations lose their importance as the prevailing kinds of state in Europe? Two things happened in this regard. First, commercialization and capital accumulation in the larger states reduced the advantage enjoyed by small mercantile states, which had previously been able to borrow extensively, tax efficiently, and rely on their own sea power to hold off large, landbound states. Second, war eventually changed in a direction that made their small scale and fragmented sovereignty a clear disadvantage, and they lost to large states. Florentine and Milanese republics crumbled under the weight of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries' military requirements. Indeed, a professional organizer of mercenary armies, Francesco Sforza, became duke of Milan in 1450 before his descendants lost their duchy to France (in 1499) and then to Spain (in 1535).

In Florence, a revived republic lasted until 1530, but then the combined forces of the pope and Emperor Charles V occupied its contado, forced a surrender of the city (despite fortifications recommended by a commission headed by Niccolò Machiavelli and built under the direction of Michelangelo Buonarroti), and installed the Medici as dukes. With the partial exceptions of Venice and Genoa, which retained some distinction as maritime powers, that era of large armies, heavy artillery, and extensive fortifications relegated all the Italian city-states to extinction, subordination, or perilous survival in the interstices of great powers.

Why did war shift from conquest for tribute and struggle among armed tribute-takers to sustained battles among massed armies and navies? This occurred for essentially the same reasons: With the organizational and technical innovations in warfare of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, states with access to large volumes of men and capital gained a clear advantage and either drove back the tribute-takers or forced them into patterns of extraction that built more durable state structures. During the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, the Russian state made the transition as Ivan III and Ivan IV used awards of land to tie bureaucrats and soldiers to long-term service to the state. During the eighteenth century, the ability of populous states like Great Britain and France to draw mass armies from their own citizens gave them the means to overpower small states.

Prior to 1800, states had, for centuries, followed divergent paths as they fashioned military forces in situations of very different relations between capital and coercion. But if this is true, then standard debates about the transition from feudalism to capitalism and the rise of consolidated states have concentrated too heavily on the experiences of France, England, and a few other massive states, while neglecting a major determinant of the actual character of states. The relative importance of cities, financiers, and capital in a zone of state formation significantly affected the kinds of states that took shape there. Great landlords overwhelmed both capitalists and kings in Poland but were practically nonexistent in Holland. The "feudalism" of Florence and its contado differed so greatly from the "feudalism" of Hungary that it hardly seems worthwhile to cover them both by the same term.

After 1800, to be sure, the directions of change in European states altered considerably. All over the Continent, states converged on the consolidated type, with its centralized organization, direct rule, uniform field administration, circumscription of resources within the territory, and expanded control over cultural practices. Two forms of nationalism became the standard political programs: the *state-led* nationalism, in which rulers deliberately promoted one cultural definition of the nation and demanded that citizens give loyalty to the state priority over other loyalties, and *state-seeking* nationalism, in which the leaders of some population defined it as distinct, coherent, and therefore deserving of separate political status or even an autonomous

state. In most states, the military now came under much firmer civilian control than in the past. As the capacity of states to extract and redistribute resources increased and as the very activities of extraction and redistribution involved rulers in bargaining with wider and wider circles of the population, states moved beyond their previous concentration on military activity and material support of rulers toward becoming general instruments of deliberate social intervention. This means they also became objects of struggles for influence over the state, unprecedented before 1800.

The unparalleled post-1800 interventionism of states and hence the increasing incentives for popular struggle to influence state personnel and policy rested on an expanded capacity to monitor, contain, seize, and redistribute resources within national territories. The relevant resources included not only goods and money but also land, natural resources, labor, technology, capital, and information. In recent years, that capacity has been declining. Especially with respect to labor, capital, technology, and information, international flows that baffle state power have increased enormously; the ability of European states to detect and counteract movements of illegal migrants, for example, has declined radically even as capital moves ever more freely from opportunity to opportunity, regardless of state interest. Furthermore, after several centuries in which capital and coercion converged under state command, they now seem to be separating; two of the world's great commercial powers—Germany and Japan—have insignificant military forces under their own command. It therefore seems possible that consolidated states will disintegrate or at least transmute into something very different. Although we have no reason to expect a reversion to states of an eighteenth-century style, the long range of state transformation we have surveyed at least hints at what might be involved in the deconsolidation of European states—or, for that matter, of states elsewhere.

Thus, for the period before 1800, the relative importance of cities, financiers, and capital in a zone of state formation significantly affected the kinds of states that took shape there. Mobilizing for war had significantly different effects, depending on the presence or absence of substantial capital and capitalists. Alternative paths of state formation led to different forms of resistance and rebellion, different state structures, and different fiscal systems. The chapters that follow analyze these alternative paths in fascinating detail.

Notes

Recruited and edited by Blockmans and Tilly, earlier versions of the essays by Andrén, Blockmans, Chittolini, Fernández Albaladejo, 't Hart, Hespanha, Moraw, Tilly, and Wyrobisz appeared in a special issue of *Theory and Society* (vol. 18, no. 5, September 1989). We are grateful to the journal for permission to reprint material from that issue. Having had to compress the papers mercilessly to fit the journal's page limits, we invited the authors to revise and expand their contributions for this volume. Andrén,

Chittolini, Hespanha, and Moraw chose to reprint their papers with no more than minor editorial changes, while Blockmans, Fernández Albaladejo, 't Hart, Wyrobisz, and Tilly undertook major revisions. Aware of an important geographic gap, Blockmans and Tilly persuaded Sergij Vilfan and Traian Stoianovich to write new syntheses on the Balkans. Andrén, Blockmans, 't Hart, Stoianovich, Tilly, Vilfan, and Wyrobisz wrote their papers in English, with Tilly editing them. Blockmans and Tilly translated Chittolini's paper from Italian, Tilly translated Hespanha's paper from French, and Blockmans translated Moraw's paper from German. Tilly translated the early version of Fernández Albaladejo's paper from Spanish, but Javier Rambaud provided English translations of new and altered material.

1. Niccolò Machiavelli, *The Prince and the Discourses* (New York: Modern Library, 1940), p. 18. I will cite specific quotations and facts directly. For more general references to authors and subjects, see the annotated bibliography at the book's end.

2. John A. Hall and G. John Ikenberry, *The State* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1989).

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5. Jan de Vries, *European Urbanization, 1500–1800* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1984), pp. 160–164.